Problem:
Voter apathy is common in DAOs. This is unsurprising when we compare the amount of time and energy that's necessary to figure out how one should vote vs the potential rewards of voting for small-holders.
Consider the following scenario. A good decision would increase the value of your tokens by 1% (compared to a bad decision). if you have a large holding of tokens, that 1% could represent thousands of dollars, but if you only have a handful, then 1% could represent pennies. Hence, in economic terms, dedicated participation in governance is unsustainable for small-holders.
To decentralise governance, it is thus necessary to redress the balance of incentives for small-holders.
Alternative Solutions to be explored in parallel:
One way to do this is through Voter Incentivisation. However, on its own, providing incentives to vote will only attract a portion of voters for whom it is rational to do so. Attracting virtually all holders to vote would require extremely generous incentives which are likely to distort governance. Voter Incentivisation will be explored in parallel.
Another solution might be to lower the barriers for participation. Curation of the information related to to make the decision and streamlining of the process could lead to higher participation rates
Vision for this solution:
A liquid democracy system, where every holder can use their local knowledge to identify a peer they deem better able to govern. Through a chain of delegation to local maxims, the system can reliably allocate power to global maxims - to those better able to govern the network.
Success: